

11 August 1982

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NIO/W Contribution to the DCI Watch Committee

Iran-Iraq

--The military stalemate on the Al Basrah front may force the Khomeini regime to take actions that will broaden the conflict. Iran already has warned shippers to avoid Kuwaiti ports and it probably will take further measures to cut off vital Iraqi imports.

--The Iranians also may mount stronger attacks in the central border area in an attempt to break through toward Baghdad. Tehran's determination to disrupt Iraq's plans to host the Non-Aligned Movement conference on 6-10 September probably will lead to further air raids on Baghdad.

Poland

--The regime's attempts to forestall protest demonstrations and strikes later this month by arresting Solidarity activists will generate greater public support for the Solidarity underground leaders' "general resistance movement." Worker reactions to arrests or provocations by hardliners in the security services could precipitate sharp confrontations, especially on the Baltic coast, that will oblige Jaruzelski, at a minimum, to restore martial law controls that were eased last month.

--There is some danger that escalating confrontations will trigger a spontaneous general strike despite the apparent desire of Solidarity underground leaders to delay such high-risk action until preparations have been completed.

Berlin

--East German harassment of some US diplomatic passport holders at Checkpoint Charlie may be a probe to test likely Western reactions to renewed Soviet and East German measures to reduce Western access to East Berlin and East Germany. The 1 August incident involving a US Military Liaison Mission (MLM) tour in East Germany could provide a pretext.

--The East German regime's heightened concern over the "peace movement" and adverse economic trends may reinforce its incentive to reduce Western liaison tours.

--In the climate of succession maneuvering, some Soviet leaders may believe that US-West European differences provide an opportunity to revive demands made in

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1976 and 1977 for a reduction in Allied flag tours in East Berlin. Moscow's demands in April 1977 seem to have been inspired in part by infighting in the leadership. Soviet pressures relaxed only after the decision was made in May to remove the then president Podgorny.

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Note for Chairman, NIC:

The item on Berlin probably is premature, but I included it with the thought that a more ominous interpretation might be brought to the Watch Committee's attention.

Both State and CIA analysts seem to be baffled by the deliberate delays at Checkpoint Charlie. The US Embassy in Berlin on 16 July candidly acknowledged that "The embassy is unable to interpret the above Soviet behavior of the past three months."

Any Soviet specialists could list a dozen reasons why Moscow would not want to heat up Berlin at this time, and I would share this general assessment. But the unexplained facts remain: US diplomatic passport holders have been sporadically delayed since March, and the Soviet embassy minister-counselor in Berlin told the US minister on 3 August that this issue had been carefully examined by his embassy and that "long discussion" had occurred between Soviet and East German authorities. In other words, the harassment is not a unilateral East German affair.

The precedent of demands to end Allied flag tours in East Berlin in 1976 and 1977 is tenuous, but that episode seems to have been created by Kremlin infighting. It led to a showdown between Brezhnev and Podgorny forces in which the latter lost his jobs in both government and party. If the succession sweepstakes are now as far advanced as our Soviet analysts believe, one would have to take account of the possibility that the competition will impact on foreign policy, even on as sensitive a point as Berlin.

We have brought our interest in these developments to attention. 25X1
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